# NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey, California



.

# **THESIS**

## SPACE BASED RADAR AND ITS IMPACT ON AIRCRAFT SUSCEPTIBILITY

by

W. Alan Ricks

December 1997

Thesis Advisor:

Robert E. Ball

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3

	·
	<u></u>
orden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for	reviewing instruction, searching existing data
and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comm	nents regarding this burden estimate or any other
The state of the s	

Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188

16. PRICE CODE

20. LIMITATION OF

**ABSTRACT** 

SECURITY CLASSIFICA-

TION OF ABSTRACT

Public reporting bu sources, gathering aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Op Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Washington DC 20503.					
1.	AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE December 1997	10	RT TYPE AT ers Thesis	ND DATES COVERED
4.	SPACE BASED RADAR AND ITS IMPA	PACE BASED RADAR AND ITS IMPACT ON AIRCRAFT SUSCEPTIBILITY 5. FUNDING NUMBERS			DING NUMBERS
6.	. W. Alan Ricks				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)  Naval Postgraduate School  Monterey CA 93943-5000		ORG	ORMING ANIZATION ORT NUMBER		
9.	9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				ISORING/MONITORING NCY REPORT NUMBER
11.	SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The view				nd do not reflect the
	official policy or position of the I	Department of Defense or the	U.S. Gover		
12a.	DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STAT				RIBUTION CODE
	Approved for public release; distri	bution is unlimited.		A.	
rel ste air sha rad ste tra con The spa thi red on car sta wil	13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) Since the US does not have the largest military force in the world, it relies on force multipliers to achieve victory. One of these force multipliers is stealth technology. However, when stealth technology is used in modern military aircraft, usually only the forward sector of the aircraft is treated and/or shaped. This forward sector treatment is effective against static, ground based radars. However, the aircraft may be very susceptible to a look-down type of radar. This thesis addresses the viability of using space-based radar to detect stealth aircraft.  Many papers have been written on how to use space-based radar to detect and track targets. However, these papers neglect to develop the satellite constellation that would be necessary to provide continuous radar coverage. These papers also do not address how susceptible stealth aircraft would be to space-based radar. The approach of this thesis was to select a target area, in this case Iraq, and develop two satellite constellations that could provide the required radar coverage. The next step was to determine if the system would be able to detect and track stealth targets.  Based on the analysis, one satellite in geosynchronous orbit can detect stealth aircraft. However, because the satellite is 35,786 km away, the power requirements, as well as the spot size are too large to track stealth aircraft. On the other hand, a constellation of 32 satellites in low earth orbit (1000 km) can both detect and track stealth aircraft. In conclusion, if the US does not start applying stealth technology to the upper surface of stealth aircraft, they will be susceptible to space-based radar.  14. SUBJECT TERMS				
14.	SORIECT TERMS				PAGES 59
l .					1110100

18. SECURITY CLASSIFI-

CATION OF THIS PAGE

Space, Radar, Satellites

SECURITY CLASSIFICA-

TION OF REPORT

# Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

# SPACE BASED RADAR AND ITS IMPACT ON AIRCRAFT SUSCEPTIBILITY

W. Alan Ricks B.S., University of Maryland, 1994

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

# MASTER OF SCIENCE IN AERONAUTICAL ENGINEERING

from the

# NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

December 1997

Author:	W Ma Li
rudioi.	W. Alan Ricks
Approved by:	It Excly
Approved by:	Robert E. Ball, Thesis Advisor
	Mos
	Michael I. Ross, Second Reader
	In Lindson)
•(	Gerald H. Lindsey, Chairman
	Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics

iv

#### **ABSTRACT**

Since the US does not have the largest military force in the world, it relies on force multipliers to achieve victory. One of these force multipliers is stealth technology. However, when stealth technology is used in modern military aircraft, usually only the forward sector of the aircraft is treated and/or shaped. This forward sector treatment is effective against static, ground based radars. However, the aircraft may be very susceptible to a look-down type of radar. This thesis addresses the viability of using space-based radar to detect stealth aircraft.

Many papers have been written on how to use space-based radar to detect and track targets. However, these papers neglect to develop the satellite constellation that would be necessary to provide continuous radar coverage. These papers also do not address how susceptible stealth aircraft would be to space-based radar. The approach of this thesis was to select a target area, in this case Iraq, and develop two satellite constellations that could provide the required radar coverage. The next step was to determine if the system would be able to detect and track stealth targets.

Based on the analysis, one satellite in geosynchronous orbit can detect stealth aircraft. However, because the satellite is 35,786 km away, the power requirements, as well as the spot size are too large to track stealth aircraft. On the other hand, a constellation of 32 satellites in low earth orbit (1000 km) can both detect and track stealth aircraft. In conclusion, if the US does not start applying stealth technology to the upper surface of stealth aircraft, they will be susceptible to space-based radar.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.	INTRODUCTION	1	
П.	BASIC RADAR PRINCIPLES	5	
Ш.	BASIC ASTRONAUTICAL PRINCIPLES	11	
IV.	SPACE BASED RADAR THREAT	17	
	A. GEOSYNCHRONOUS ORBIT	18	
	B. LOW EARTH ORBIT	29	
V.	CONCLUSION S	35	
APPEN	NDIX-LEO ACCESS TIMES TO IRAQ	37	
LIST C	OF REFERENCES	57	
INITIA	NITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST		

viii

### **ACKNOWLEDGMENT**

I would like to thank Analytical Graphics for allowing me to use some of the diagrams contained in their book "Satellite Tool Kit an Astronautics Primer." These diagrams were used in Chapter III to help explain basic astronautical terms.

I especially thank Analytical Graphics for allowing me to use their professional version of Satellite Tool Kit (STK 4.0). Their software program was used extensively in the development of my thesis. The two different satellite configurations in Chapter IV were developed in a few weeks using STK 4.0, rather than a few months had it been done by hand. All of the diagrams showing the constellation design and ground tracks were generated using STK 4.0.

I would also like to thank Professor Ball at the Naval Postgraduate School for helping me complete my thesis as part of the NAVAIR/NPS distance learning program. His support to the distance learning program has allowed me and many other professionals to continue their education.

### I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the impact space-based radar will have on the combat susceptibility of current and future United States military aircraft. Combat susceptibility, in simple terms, refers to the probability an aircraft will be hit by a weapon. Several sequences lead to the aircraft getting hit by a round, missile, or directed energy weapon. The first two phases are detection and tracking by a surveillance or tracking sensor. Stealth, the ability of an aircraft to delay detection or degrade tracking, can significantly lower an aircraft's susceptibility. However, space-based radar could pose a significant threat to stealth technology.

The current design trend for stealth aircraft is to take the incoming radar energy and bounce what can not be absorbed into a direction away from the mono-static radar. This task is mainly accomplished by treating certain sections of the aircraft, namely the frontal sector of the aircraft. The upper surface of most stealth aircraft is usually ignored or receives very little treatment. For ground-based radars, this does not present a problem. However, for a space-based radar, this neglect could pose a real problem.

With spacecraft launch costs dropping and the miniaturization of computer and radar equipment (the lighter the payload, the cheaper the cost), more and more countries are gaining access to space. Table 1 shows a list of countries that currently have access to space as of October 1994 [Ref. 1: p. 7].

Space -Capable	Nations
Level	Country
First Tier	United States
	Russia
Second Tier	France
	Great Britain
	China
	Japan
	India
	Israel
Third Tier*	Brazil
	Italy
* Not all inclusive, only major nations	Australia
listed.	Thailand
	South Africa
	Canada
	Iran
	Iraq
	Pakistan

Table 1.

Tier 1 represents space-capable nations that possess both military and civilian space capabilities that are on the cutting edge of technology. Second tier nations have dual purpose space systems that serve both civilian and military purposes. The third tier countries purchase or lease space capabilities from tier 1 and 2 countries. [Ref. 1]

Based on the data contained in Table 1, today, most countries do not pose a threat to US stealth aircraft. However, the acquisition process for a new system can take from 10 to 15 years and new weapons platforms are expected to last at least 30 years or more. This means that the systems we design today, must be able to handle threats in the year 2037 and beyond. At the given rate of technological growth, there will be many

more countries in the future with satellite capabilities. These satellites may carry radar systems capable of detecting and tracking stealth aircraft.

It should be pointed out that while this thesis addresses the impact of space-based radar, there are two other major counter stealth detection technologies available. The first is optical detection. It is now possible to buy space-based optical systems off the shelf that can give resolutions up to 1 meter [Ref.2]. These systems are not classified and are available to anyone. The advantage of using optics is that very little power is required to view the target (compared to radar). The reason for this is that unlike radar, the visual image only has to make a one way trip to the satellite verses a round trip required by radar. The disadvantage of using optics is that viewing times are limited by the weather (clouds) and lighting conditions.

The second form of detection technology that could be used is infrared sensing. Infrared systems also require less energy than radar and allow for nighttime viewing. Infrared systems provide better coverage in weather than optics, but they still have more limitations than radar (energy is still absorbed by clouds and rain). A realistic satellite detection system would most likely encompass a combination of visual, infrared, and radar technologies.

This thesis will examine space-based radar applications and determine if the technology is a viable threat to US stealth aircraft. Chapter II will discuss basic radar principles, Chapter III will provide a brief overview of orbital mechanics, and Chapter

IV will address the viability of using space-based radar to detect stealth aircraft. The final chapter will discuss the conclusions.

## II. BASIC RADAR PRINCIPLES

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief overview of radar fundamentals.

Radar is a very complicated subject and can not be adequately addressed in a few pages.

However, the basic principles and concepts will be presented in order to provide the reader with the tools necessary to understand the premise of this thesis.

Radar (Radio Detection and Ranging) is the process of using electromagnetic waves to detect and track a target. Radio waves have a wide range of frequencies. The frequency, f, is the number of times a radar wave passes a given point in space (in a given amount of time) and is inversely related to the wavelength (wavelength,  $\lambda$ =c/f, where c is the speed of light). The higher the frequency, the smaller the wavelength. Radar systems work by transmitting an electromagnetic wave from the radar antenna, to the target at the speed of light (3X10<sup>8</sup> m/s). The energy that hits the target is scattered in different directions. The energy that bounces back in the direction of the radar appears as a blip on the radar screen. The goal is to get the largest amount of energy returned to the radar.

An antenna is used to transmit and receive radio waves. An omni-directional antenna radiates energy equally in all directions. The target is going to be located in a certain sector. By taking the energy being radiated into unoccupied sectors (wasted energy) and focusing it in the direction of the target, larger signal returns will be received and allow the target to be detected at greater distances. The red circle in Figure 1. shows

the radar energy being radiated equally in all directions. The black colored lobe shows the energy being directed to a specific sector (referred to as gain, G) [Ref. 3]. The larger the gain, the larger the directivity. If the radar energy is focused in a particular direction, scans need to be performed to locate the target (radar dishes rotate in order to locate the target). Scans can be performed rapidly, therefore, in most cases, the benefit from using gain is not significantly hindered by limited exposure time.




Figure 1.

The equation for the received signal energy (without losses) is given below (one form of the Radar Range Equation). The reader is directed to Appendix B of Professor Ball's book, The Fundamentals of Aircraft Combat Survivability Analysis and Design, for a derivation [Ref. 4].

$$S = P_t G^2 \lambda^2 \sigma (4\pi)^3 R^4$$

Where P<sub>t</sub> is the power transmitted, R is the range, and σ is the radar cross section. The radar cross section is a measure of how much energy is scattered in the direction of the radar. Measurements are typically taken all the way around the aircraft (360° in azimuth) with the nose located at 0°. Measurements are also taken with the aircraft pitched at varying degrees (usually around +/- 5°). The data is measured in square meters or decibels, with one square meter being the reference level (dB<sub>sm</sub>). Figure 2. shows a typical signature pattern for an aircraft [Ref. 5]. An aircraft with a large signature will be detected before an aircraft with a small signature.




Figure 2. Radar Cross Section Example

A more useful form of the of the Radar Range Equation incorporates a signal to noise ratio, S/N. No radar system is perfect, and all radar systems encounter a certain level of noise. The larger the signal to noise ratio the less likely the system is to have a false alarm and the more likely it is to detect the target. By dividing both sides of the Radar Range Equation by the noise, N, its effects on the system can be incorporated (this form of the Radar Range Equation is used in Chapter IV).

There are two main types of radar: continuous wave radars and pulse radars.

Continuous wave radars are on all of the time (receive and send) and are primarily used for acquisition (long range detection). Pulse radars repeatedly transmit for a certain period of time (known as pulse width) and receive for the rest of the time. Pulse radars are used to track targets. The closer the target, the higher the pulse repetition frequency needs to be in order to track the target [Ref. 6].

Beamwidth is another important concept in the study of radar. Beamwidth refers to how wide the beam is and is measured in degrees or radians. Since the radar power dissipates with angle, radar engineers use a term called the 3-dB beamwidth. When the radar energy drops to half of its original strength (3-dB), that angular location defines the boundary of the beam. The beam width for a circular aperture is given by the following equation [Ref 6: p.136]:

$$\theta_{3dB} = \frac{1.02 \lambda}{d}$$

Where d is the diameter of the antenna and the results are in radians. Related to the beamwidth is the foot print or spot size at the target location. Since the beamwidth is an angular measure, the closer the target is to the radar, the smaller the spot size.

Conversely, the farther away the target is, the larger the spot size. In general, a large spot size is used for detection and a small spot size is used for tracking. In order to cover a specific region, the spots must move. The time it takes for the spot to sweep over the entire region is considered one scan.

## III. BASIC ASTRONATICAL PRINCIPLES

The purpose of this section is to provide the reader with a brief overview of orbital mechanics. Satellites can have a wide range of orbits. These orbits as well as the satellite's position are described by six classical elements. The first element is the semi major axis, a. This is a measure of the size of the orbit. The second orbital element is eccentricity, e. Eccentricity defines the shape of the orbit. For example, when e=0, the orbit is a circular. When e is between 0 and 1, the shape of the orbit is an ellipse. The larger e is, the greater the eccentricity. The third element is the inclination, i. Inclination is the angle between the Earth's equator and the satellite's orbit (see Figure 3.).

inclination	Orbit Type	Diagram
O* ≈ i ≈ 180*	Equatorial	
i = 90*	Polar	1=80°
0° ≤ î < 90°	Direct or posigrade (moves in direction of Earth's rotation)	ascending node
90° < i <u>&lt;</u> 180°	Indirect or retrograde (moves against the direction of Earth's rotation)	

Figure 3. Inclination Examples, From Ref. [7]

In order to discuss the three other orbital elements, a reference frame needs to be established. Using the standard Cartesian coordinate system, i points toward the vernal equinox, k points north through the center of the Earth, and j is defined by the right hand rule (see Figure 4).




Figure 4. Satellite Coordinate Systems, From Ref. [7].

The fourth element, the Right assention of the ascending node (RAAN or  $\Omega$ ), is the angle between the i direction and the ascending node. The ascending node is the point where the satellite crosses the equatorial plane (moving south to north). The fifth element is the argument of perigee,  $\omega$ . The argument of perigee is the angular sweep from the ascending node to perigee. Perigee is the point in the orbit where the satellite is the

closest to the Earth (apogee is the farthest point). The true anomaly, v, is the angular location of the satellite from perigee. Figure 5. Shows a planer view of the orbit.




Figure 5. True Anomaly, From Ref. [7].

Another important aspect in understanding satellite orbits is their projection onto the Earth's surface. The projections are know as a ground tracks. Figure 6. shows a sample orbit around the Earth (note that the Earth is not spinning). Projection of the orbit onto a flat map yields a periodic track.




Figure 6. Ground Track, From Ref. [7]

Since the Earth actually spins while the satellite rotates in its orbit, the ground track will move over the surface of the Earth. Figure 7. shows what the first and second orbital passes would look like.




Figure 7. Rotating Earth Ground Track, From Ref. [7]

The lower the orbit (smaller period), the more ground tracks over time. The larger the orbit (larger period) the fewer ground tracks over time. Figure 8. shows the ground tracks for various orbits. At an altitude of 35,786 km a satellite with zero degree inclination will have the same rotation rate as the Earth (24 hr period) and there will be no ground track, only a single point (see Figure 8, item E). This is known as a geosynchronous orbit. Item A has a period of 2.67 hours. Items B, C, and D have corresponding periods of 8 hrs, 18 hrs, and 24 hrs.




Figure 8. Ground Tracks, From Ref. [7].

## IV. SPACE BASED RADAR THREAT

The purpose of this section is to determine whether it is feasible to use space based radar to detect stealth aircraft from space. Two different scenarios have been developed to determine if a space based radar can be used to pick up aircraft targets that have not been treated on the upper surface. The hypothetical threat was chosen to be Iraq (see Figure 9).




Figure 9. Iraq, From Ref. [8]

The two extremes, geosynchronous orbit and low earth orbit, were chosen for analysis purposes. There are an infinite number of orbits that could provide satellite coverage and years could be spent creating the optimal satellite configuration. The goal of the analysis is to show what problems would be encountered at each end of the spectrum and determine if there are solutions.

#### A. GEOSYNCHRONOUS ORBIT

The first scenario involves a satellite in geosynchronous orbit. From this vantage point the satellite rotates around the earth at the same rate as the Earth's rotation. This allows the satellite to see the same geographic location at all times. Figure 10. shows a satellite in geosynchronous orbit with its antenna pointed at Iraq. Figure 11. shows a blow up of the same view (viewing angle changed for increased clarity).



Figure 10. Geostationary Satellite, Ref. [9]




Figure 11. Zoom in, Ref. [9]

Note there is no ground track because relative to the earth there is no satellite motion (see Figure 12.).




Figure 12. Ground Track

The next two figures show a blow up over Iraq (Figures 13 and 14).




Figure 13. Zoom in on Iraq, Ref. [9].




Figure 14. Larger Zoom in on Iraq, Ref. [9].

The times that the satellite has access to Iraq is summed up in Figure 13. Only one day is represented in the figure, but the coverage would be the same for each successive day.




Figure 13. GEO Access Times

While having the advantage of being able to see the same area all the time, being in geosynchronous orbit poses a few technical challenges. The satellite is 35,786 km above the Earth's surface. The first challenge is to determine if a satellite with enough power for detection can be put in this type of orbit. We will use the radar range equation listed below to determine the power requirements of the satellite [Ref. 10:p. 49].

$$P_t = \frac{S(4\pi)^3 R^4 k T B_r}{NG^2 \lambda^2 \sigma}$$

For analysis purposes we are assuming a perfect radar (except for noise).  $P_t$  is the power needed to transmit, S/N is the signal to noise ratio, R is the range (35,786 km in

geosynchronous orbit), k is Boltzmann's constant (1.38 X  $10^{-23}$  watt-second/°K), T is temperature (°K),  $B_{n}$  is the bandwidth, G is the antenna gain,  $\lambda$  is the wave length, and  $\sigma$  is the signature of the target. For analysis purposes we wish to have a probability of detection of at least 90%. Figure 14. shows the relation between probability of detection and the required S/N ratio (for the given false alarm rate). Case I is for a scan to scan S/N ratio for an airplane type target and Case II is for a pulse to pulse S/N ratio for an airplane type target. Using Case II, a 90% probability of detection corresponds to a S/N ratio of 15.2 dB.




Figure 14. Signal to Noise vs. Detection Probability, From Ref. [6].

The antenna noise temperature for 1 GHz is about 70 °K [Ref. 11 and 12]. Lastly, the bandwidth is a function of the pulse width (B<sub>n</sub>=2/pulse width, measured Hz) [Ref. 6: p. 259].

An acquisition radar usually has its radar on for extended periods of time (continuous wave radars). However, for space based radar the background clutter of the earth needs to be filtered out. This is done by pulsing the radar. From geosynchronous orbit it takes the radar pulses 0.23857 seconds to reach the earth and bounce back (assuming a uniform spherical earth; the numbers would vary form location to location, i.e. mountainous terrain). Any return that is received before 0.23857 seconds is a possible aircraft. In order to keep the pulses from overlapping the echoes, the pulses must be spaced at least 0.2386 seconds apart, plus the pulse width time. For the acquisition case, the pulse width was chosen to be 1 second (the larger the pulse width, the less power required). For tracking, the pulse repetition frequency needs to be around 0.001 seconds or smaller and the pulse width should be on the same order or smaller [Ref. 6]. A pulse width of 0.001 seconds will be used in the tracking scenario.

One important feature of the geosynchronous radar is the very small difference in range between the target and the background clutter (the Earth). A fighter aircraft flying at an altitude of 3,048 meters (10,000 feet) would be 35,782,952 meters from the satellite. At this distance, the satellite would receive a signal from the target 0.23855 seconds after it was sent, only 0.00002 seconds faster than the clutter return from the ground. Current software and signal processing technologies can be used to discriminate

the difference (examples are pulse modulation and pulse compression: For detailed discussions on ways to solve the ground clutter problem, the reader is referred to the references 13, 14, 15 and 16).

The gain for a parabolic reflector is given below [Ref. 6].

$$G=(\underline{\pi D})^2$$

The parabolic antenna is assumed to have a diameter of 20 meters (perfectly feasible in space). In order to minimize atmospheric losses, a frequency of 1 GHz was selected. See Figures 15. and 16. for plots of atmospheric loss verses frequency.




Figure 15. Atmospheric Losses 1, From Ref. [11]




Figure 15. Atmospheric Losses 2, From Ref. [11]

The upper surface of the aircraft is assumed to have a signature of 100 m<sup>2</sup>, a very reasonable assumption.

Based on the aforementioned assumptions and the equations in this Chapter, the satellite would need to have about 12 kW of power for a 90% chance of detecting the target. If we extrapolate the data given in figure 16., the power available in 1997 would be about 5 kW. The power improvements over time are due to increased efficiency of the solar cells, an increase in solar array size, and improved battery performance. Even with

the power improvements, there is still not enough power required to detect the target. Even more power would be required to track the target (12,000 kW) due to the lower pulse repetition frequency.




Figure 16. Satellite Power, From Ref. [11]

To reduce the power requirement, instead of having a single pulse probability of detection of 90%, a cumulative probability of detection of 90% could be specified. The formula for the cumulative probability of detection is given below [Ref. 6].

$$P_c=1-(1-P_d)^n$$

P<sub>c</sub> is the cumulative probability of detection, P<sub>d</sub> is the single scan probability of detection, and n is the number of scans. By lowering the probability of detection to 37.5% (S/N=8 dB) and performing 5 scans (equivalent to 6.2 seconds), a cumulative probability of detection of 90.4% is obtained. This results in a power requirement of 2.3 kW, well within reason. When the cumulative probability of detection is applied to the tracking scenario, power requirements are still unrealistic (2,290 kW) and the time delay would make active tracking unrealistic.

The spot size for this particular scenario has a diameter of 548 km and covers an area of 235,858 km<sup>2</sup>. Since Iraq has a square area of 441,839 km<sup>2</sup>, a rough approximation would indicate that the spot would have to be moved twice to cover the entire area. Even if enough power were available for tracking, the spot size would be too large to track the target.

Solutions to the power problem are forthcoming. The Air Force's Phillips

Laboratory is currently working on developing a satellite system that can develop 20 kW of continuos power and 50 kW of peak power [Ref. 17:p. 57]. The Air Force is also working on "flexible blanket" solar arrays that can provide 150 kW per kilogram [Ref. 17:p 57]. Another possible solution to the power problem is a bi-static system. A larger transmitting antenna could be placed on earth and the satellite would only need to receive the signals (drastically reducing satellite power requirements). Bi-static systems are very complex in nature and well beyond the scope of this thesis.

This page intentionally left blank

## B. LOW EARTH ORBIT

The second scenario involves using satellites in low earth orbit (LEO) to track aircraft targets. By placing a satellite in low earth orbit the distance problem is solved (GEO is at 35,786 km and the power required is a function of R<sup>4</sup>), but it creates new technical challenges. In LEO, the satellite does not rotate at the same rate as the Earth, hence one satellite can not see the same location at all times. The closer the satellite is to the Earth, the more satellites you need to provide continuous coverage. For this scenario an altitude of 1000 km was chosen.

In order to provide continuous coverage at an altitude of 1000 km, 32 satellites are needed. The satellites are placed in eight, 90° inclined, orbits with right assention of the ascending node values of 0°, 45°, 90°, 135°, 180°, 225°, 270°, and 325°. Each orbit contains 4 equally spaced satellites (true anomalies of 0°,90°,180° and 270°). Figure 17. shows the orbits with Iraq once again being the target area.




Figure 17. LEO Access, Ref. [9]

Figure 18. shows a blow up of the ground tracks and the area of coverage. Note that there are so many ground tracks that if we zoomed out (entire Earth view) the entire picture would be yellow with ground tracks.




Figure 18. Iraq Coverage, Ref. [9]

To improve picture clarity, figure 19 show the same area with the ground tracks removed.




Figure 19. Iraq with Ground Tracks Removed, Ref. [9]

The access times between the satellites and Iraq are summed up in figure 20 (a detailed list of access times is listed the Appendix).




Figure 20. LEO Access times to Iraq, Ref. [9].

It should be mentioned that there are certain instances where the target area can be covered by more than one satellite (see Figure 21). Further orbital analysis could be performed to try to reduce the number of satellites (the purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the two extremes, years could be spent trying to find the optimal satellite configuration for a given target area) or the satellites could be configured for a bi-static configuration (again beyond the scope of this thesis).




Figure 21. Multiple Access, Ref. [9]

Using the same radar range equation used in section IVa, a single probability of detection of 90%, and a 5 meter antenna, a LEO satellite would only need 0.78 kW of power to detect the target. Using an 8 meter diameter antenna the power needed to track the target (using a pulse width of 0.001 s) is 2.02 kW, again very feasible. The time it takes for the radar signal to reach the Earth and bounce back is 0.0067 seconds. The time it takes to receive the signal from an aircraft flying at an altitude of 10,000 feet is 0.0064 seconds. The time difference is better than GEO, but still very small (0.0003 s). The target can be puled out of the clutter by using modern pulse compression techniques [Ref. 13,14,15,16].

The spot sizes for the 5 meter and 8 meter dishes have diameters 61 km and 38 km respectively. This corresponds to square areas of 2922 km<sup>2</sup> and 1134 km<sup>2</sup>. Again, noting that Iraq has a square area of 441,839 km<sup>2</sup> and using a rough approximation, it would take the 5 meter dish 390 spots or about 3 seconds to complete one scan of the area. For the 8 meter dish it would take about 151 spots or about 1.2 seconds for one scan of the area. A LEO satellite constellation poses a real threat to the US's stealth aircraft.

## V. CONCLUSIONS

Based on the analysis and simplified assumptions, future space-based radar systems may pose a significant threat to current stealth technology design trends.


Although challenging, using today's technology, a satellite in GEO can detect aircraft targets on the earth. Because of the large power requirements and spot size, this type of systems would only be useful for early warning. Target discrimination would not be possible and therefore it is not yet feasible to track in GEO. However, as power generation and processing techniques improve, this could all change.

A satellite in LEO can both detect and track targets. The tracking rate in LEO is not yet high enough for missile guidance, but it is high enough that a fighter could be given coordinates and vectored to the general area. The number of satellites needed in LEO (32 in the Iraq scenario) might seem excessive and unrealistic, but there are several satellite constellations with the number of satellites ranging from 8 to 66 that will be put into LEO between now and 2002 [Ref. 18]. In the future, advanced satellite systems may be able to detect the target, track the target, and guide missiles close enough for their own internal guidance systems to take over.

The are a few solutions to the problem. The first would be to apply radar absorbing materials to the upper surface of stealth aircraft. This would reduce the aircraft's signature and make it more difficult to detect and track. Another solution is to use jamming. A ground or space-based system could be set up to saturate the satellite's

receiving antenna. Going one step farther, the satellites could be destroyed before the aircraft are sent into a hostile area. This of course would go against the International agreement for non aggression in space [Ref. 19]. However, as this thesis is being written, the Air Force is currently waiting for approval to fire one of it high powered, ground based lasers at one of its own (old and dying) satellites to see how badly it would be damaged [Ref. 20]. The wars in the future are going to get a lot more complicated.

# APPENDIX-LEO ACCESS TIMES TO IRAQ



Low Earth Orbit Access to Iraq (32 Satellites)

# 02 Oct 1988 08:28:45

Satellite 12, Satellite-Satellite 13, Satellite-Satellite 2, Satellite-Satellite 21, Satellite-Satellite Satellite S Satellite-Satell Area Target-Iraq-To-Satellite-Satellite0, Satellite-Satellite01, Satellite-Satellite02, Satellite-Satellite03, Satellite-Satellite1, Satellite-International Satellite11, Satellite-Satellite-Satellite11, Satellite-Satellite Satellite-Satellite71, Satellite-Satellite72, Satellite-Satellite73: Access Summary Report

Iraq-To-Satellite0 - Access Iraq-To-Satellite0 - Start Time (UTCG) Iraq-To-Satellite0 - Stop Time (UTCG) Iraq-To-Satellite0 -

							902.276
	1018.061	1198.644	902.276	918.383	1208.508	992.775	4 3 1039.774 6238.646
	l Jan 1997 00:51:13.86	Jan 1997 02:38:03.15	Jan 1997 04:19:29.94	Jan 1997 12:35:09.66	Jan 1997 14:21:45.13	Jan 1997 16:05:45.21	1 Jan 1997 04:19:29.94 1 Jan 1997 14:21:45.13
	1 Ja	1 Ja	1 Ja	1 Ja	1 Ja	1 Ja	l Jan 1997 04:04:27.67 1 Jan 1997 14:01:36.63
	Jan 1997 00:34:15.80	Jan 1997 02:18:04.50	Jan 1997 04:04:27.67	Jan 1997 12:19:51.28	l Jan 1997 14:01:36.63	Jan 1997 15:49:12.43	1 Jan 1997 1 Jan 1997
Duration (sec)	1	2	3	4	•	9	Global Statistics  Min Iraq-To-Satellite0 - Duration  Max Iraq-To-Satellite0 - Duration  Mean Iraq-To-Satellite0 - Duration  Total Iraq-To-Satellite0 - Duration

Iraq-To-Satellite01 - Access Iraq-To-Satellite01 - Start Time (UTCG) Iraq-To-Satellite01 - Stop Time (UTCG) Iraq-To-Satellite01 - Duration (sec)

	853.160	1202.729	1024.896	704.059	1186.527	1089.826
***************************************	1 Jan 1997 00:23:16.88	1 Jan 1997 02:11:54.81	1 Jan 1997 03:54:38.12	1 Jan 1997 12:07:41.10	1 Jan 1997 13:55:21.94	1 Jan 1997 15:40:03.37
	1 Jan 1997 00:09:03.72	1 Jan 1997 01:51:52.08	1 Jan 1997 03:37:33.23	1 Jan 1997 11:55:57.04	1 Jan 1997 13:35:35.42	1 Jan 1997 15:21:53.55
	-	2	<b>e</b>	4	55	9

•	
•	•
••	۰
-	i
- 67	
-	ā
	į
71	
-	ı
	ė
-	3
- 20	ī
	2
_	:
	2
_	٠
71	٠
(*	j
•	,

Min Iraq-To-Satellite01 - Duration Max Iraq-To-Satellite01 - Duration Mean Iraq-To-Satellite01 - Duration Total Iraq-To-Satellite01 - Duration	4 1 Jan 1997 2 1 Jan 1997	1 Jan 1997 11:55:57.04 1 Jan 1997 01:51:52.08	1 Jan 1997 12:07:41.10 1 Jan 1997 02:11:54.81	2:07:41.10 2:11:54.81 1010.200 6061.197	704.059
Iraq-To-Satellite02 - Access Satellite02 - Access	Iraq-To-Satellite02 - Start	Time (UTCG)	Iraq-To-Satellite02	Iraq-To-Satellite02 - Start Time (UTCG) Iraq-To-Satellite02 - Stop Time (UTCG) Iraq-To-	۵۰
1 2 3 3 5 5 6	1 Jan 1997 01:25:48.52 1 Jan 1997 03:10:53.92 1 Jan 1997 05:00:51.94 1 Jan 1997 13:09:57.64 1 Jan 1997 14:54:43.00 1 Jan 1997 16:46:11.60	1 Jan 1 Jan 1 Jan 1 Jan 1 Jan 1 Jan 1 Jan	1 Jan 1997 01:45:25.74 1 Jan 1997 03:29:17.23 1 Jan 1997 05:06:09.55 1 Jan 1997 13:28:49.86 1 Jan 1997 15:14:06.96 1 Jan 1997 16:55:16.12	1177.225 1103.303 317.605 1132.223 1163.960 544.528	ı
Global Statistics	3 1 Jan 1997 05:00:51.94 1 1 Jan 1997 01:25:48.52	l Jan 1997 05:00:51.94 1 Jan 1997 01:25:48.52	1 Jan 1997 05:06:09.55 1 Jan 1997 01:45:25.74	5:06:09.55 1:45:25.74 906.474 5438.844	317.605
Iraq-To-Satellite03 - Access Satellite03 - Duration (sec)	Iraq-To-Satellite03 - Start	Time (UTCG)	Iraq-To-Satellite03 -	Iraq-To-Satellite03 - Start Time (UTCG) Iraq-To-Satellite03 - Stop Time (UTCG) Iraq-To-	4

1048.569 1200.082 836.142

1 Jan 1997 13:02:06.56 1 Jan 1997 14:48:00.27 1 Jan 1997 16:31:01.50

> 1 Jan 1997 14:28:00.19 1 Jan 1997 16:17:05.35

1 Jan 1997 01:18:31.04 1 Jan 1997 03:03:51.38

1 Jan 1997 00:59:55.54 1 Jan 1997 02:44:24.99 1 Jan 1997 04:31:50.75 1 Jan 1997 12:44:37.99

1 Jan 1997 04:43:35.94

1115.497 1166.397 705.192

	1 Jan 1997 23:50:57.58	::50:57.58	2 Jan 1997 00:00:00	542,425	
Global Statistics	. 1	1 Ian 1997 23.50.57 58	8 2 Ian 1997 00:00:00 00	542.425	25
Max Iraq-To-Satellite03 - Duration Max Iraq-To-Satellite03 - Duration Mean Iraq-To-Satellite03 - Duration Total Iraq-To-Satellite03 - Duration	. <b>v</b> s	1 Jan 1997 14:28:00.19		944.900 6614.302	082
Iraq-To-Satellite1 - Access Duration (sec)		e1 - Start Time (UTCC	Iraq-To-Satellite1 - Start Time (UTCG) Iraq-To-Satellite1 - Stop Time (UTCG) Iraq-To-Satellite1 -	JTCG) Iraq-To-Satellite1	•
1	1 Jan 1997 04:04:00.99		Jan 1997 04:22:50.03	1129.044	
2	1 Jan 1997 05:48:36.64	_	Jan 1997 06:07:53.93	1157.298	
	1 Jan 1997 07:36:18.15	1	Jan 1997 07:47:16.39	658.244	
4	1 Jan 1997 15:48:35.91		Jan 1997 16:06:22.40	1066.492	
\$	1 Jan 1997 17:32:13.15	1	Jan 1997 17:52:09.27	1196.117	
9	1 Jan 1997 19:21:38.49		Jan 1997 19:34:56.01	797.517	
Global Statistics					
Min Iraq-To-Satellite1 - Duration		1 Jan 1997 07:36:18.15	1 Jan 1997 07:47:16.39	658.244	
Max Iraq-To-Satellite1 - Duration Mean Iraq-To-Satellite1 - Duration	ۍ 1	1 Jan 1997 17:32:13.15	1 Jan 1997 17:52:09.27 1	1196.117 1000.785	_
Total Iraq-To-Satellite1 - Duration			)9	6004.712	
Iraq-To-Satellite11 - Access Satellite11 - Duration (sec)		lite 11 - Start Time (U7	Iraq-To-Satellite11 - Start Time (UTCG) Iraq-To-Satellite11 - Stop Time (UTCG) Iraq-To-	me (UTCG) Iraq-To-	

946.241 1209.157

1 Jan 1997 05:42:10.00 1 Jan 1997 07:23:21.05

1 Jan 1997 03:55:36.94

1 Jan 1997 03:38:18.09 1 Jan 1997 05:22:14.76 1 Jan 1997 15:39:28.73 1 Jan 1997 17:25:55.60

1 Jan 1997 07:08:46.66 1 Jan 1997 15:23:42.49 1 Jan 1997 17:05:46.44

1038.854 1195.237 874.395

9	1 Jan 1997 18:53:36.35		1 Jan 1997 19:09:46.85	970.491	
Global Statistics					
Min Iraq-To-Satellite 11 - Duration  Max Iraq-To-Satellite 11 - Duration  Mean Iraq-To-Satellite 11 - Duration	ه م 1	1 Jan 1997 07:08:46.66 1 Jan 1997 17:05:46.44	1 Jan 1997 07:23:21.05 1 Jan 1997 17:25:55.60	:23:21.05 7:25:55.60 1039.062	874.395 1209.157
10ial Itaq-10-Satellite11 - Duration  Iraq-To-Satellite12 - Access Satellite12 - Duration (sec)		te12 - Start Time (UTC	3) Iraq-To-Satellite12 -	6234.375  Iraq-To-Satellite12 - Start Time (UTCG) Iraq-To-Satellite12 - Stop Time (UTCG) Iraq-To-	-oL
1	1 Jan 1997 03:12:59.53	-	Jan 1997 03:27:48.90	889.374	
2	1 Jan 1997 04:56:00.92	1	Jan 1997 05:16:04.71	1203.794	
3	1 Jan 1997 06:41:48.64	-	Jan 1997 06:58:35.75	1007.106	
4	1 Jan 1997 14:59:36.03	1	Jan 1997 15:12:08.24	752.208	
5	1 Jan 1997 16:39:41.14	-	Jan 1997 16:59:33.90	1192.760	
9	1 Jan 1997 18:26:14.62	1	Jan 1997 18:44:08.48	1073.854	
Global Statistics					
Min Iraq-To-Satellite12 - Duration	4	1 Jan 1997 14:59:36.03	1 Jan 1997 15:12:08.24	:12:08.24	752.208
Max Iraq-To-Satellite12 - Duration Mean Iraq-To-Satellite12 - Duration	2	1 Jan 1997 04:56:00.92	1 Jan 1997 05:16:04.71		1203.794
Total Iraq-To-Satellite12 - Duration				1019.849 6119.096	
Irag-To-Satellite13 - Access		old - Chart Time (TITC)	Tree To Contain the		í
Satellite 13 - Duration (sec)		010 - Statt 111116 (0100	of trad-10-Satellite13 - i	may ro-sammings - start time (OTCG) traq-10-satellites 3-stop time (OTCG) traq-10-	-o <u>.</u>

603.341 1184.160 1091.166 111.270 307.462

1 Jan 1997 02:58:48.50 1 Jan 1997 04:49:39.87 1 Jan 1997 06:33:18.35 1 Jan 1997 08:08:47.23 1 Jan 1997 14:43:08.46

> 1 Jan 1997 04:29:55.71 1 Jan 1997 06:15:07.18 1 Jan 1997 08:06:55.96 1 Jan 1997 14:38:01.00

2645

1 Jan 1997 02:48:45.16

	9 / 8	1 Jan 1997 1 Jan 1997 1 Jan 1997	16:13:59.52 17:59:00.58 19:51:04.78	1 Jan 1997 16:33:03.56 1 Jan 1997 18:18:14.27 1 Jan 1997 19:58:47.00	:03.56 :14.27 :47.00	1144.047 1153.693 462.220	
Global Statistics  Min Iraq-To-Satellite13 - Duration  Max Iraq-To-Satellite13 - Duration  Mean Iraq-To-Satellite13 - Duration  Total Iraq-To-Satellite13 - Duration		4 %	1 Jan 1997 08:06:55.96 1 Jan 1997 04:29:55.71		1 Jan 1997 08:08:47.23 1 Jan 1997 04:49:39.87 757	111.270 1184.160 757.170 6057.360	
Iraq-To-Satel Duration (sec)	Iraq-To-Satellite2 - Access	Iraq-To-Satell	Iraq-To-Satellite2 - Start Time (UTCG)		Iraq-To-Satellite2 - Stop Time (UTCG)	) Iraq-To-Satellite2 -	
	1 2 5 7 7 9 7 7	1 Jan 1997 05:52:23.30 1 Jan 1997 07:34:03.04 1 Jan 1997 09:19:20.66 1 Jan 1997 17:40:41.18 1 Jan 1997 19:18:01.49 1 Jan 1997 21:03:18.95 1 Jan 1997 22:56:08.30		Jan 1997 06:03:36.89 Jan 1997 07:53:53.07 Jan 1997 09:37:19.67 Jan 1997 17:48:08.63 Jan 1997 19:37:16.75 Jan 1997 21:22:21.15 Jan 1997 23:01:56.09		673.593 1190.027 1079.014 447.453 1155.255 1142.202 347.794	·
Global Statistics		2	1 Jan 1997 22:56:08.30 1 Jan 1997 07:34:03.04		1 Jan 1997 23:01:56.09 1 Jan 1997 07:53:53.07 862.191 6035.338	347.794 1190.027 1 8	
Iraq-To-Sate Satellite21 - Duration (sec)	Iraq-To-Satellite21 - Access		Iraq-To-Satellite21 - Start Time (UTCG)		Iraq-To-Satellite21 - Stop Time (UTCG)	TCG) Iraq-To-	
	2 1	1 Jan 1997 1 Jan 1997	07:08:06.41 08:52:48.42	1 Jan 1997 07:27:07.94 1 Jan 1997 09:11:55.53	7:07.94	1141.525	
		·					
							.!

	606.527 1191.125	-To-	844.002 1208.825 To-	
606.527 1083.110 1191.125 754.346	50:55.18 :56:17.86 987.290 5923.740	Stop Time (UTCG) Iraq-To-	1057.854 1190.856 844.002 971.777 1208.825 946.160 30:05.67 1036.579 6219.473 stop Time (UTCG) Iraq-To-	922.084 1203.903
1 Jan 1997 10:50:55.18 1 Jan 1997 19:10:37.77 1 Jan 1997 20:56:17.86 1 Jan 1997 22:38:48.24	1 Jan 1997 10:50:55.18 1 Jan 1997 20:56:17.86	) Iraq-To-Satellite22 - Stop Time (UTCG)	Jan 1997 06:59:58.72  Jan 1997 08:46:15.98  Jan 1997 10:27:10.51  Jan 1997 10:27:10.51  Jan 1997 20:30:05.67  Jan 1997 20:30:05.67  I Jan 1997 20:30:05.67  I Jan 1997 20:30:05.67  G219.473  G1 Iraq-To-Satellite23 - Stop Time (UTCG)	1 Jan 1997 06:32:18.79 1 Jan 1997 08:20:13.76
l Jan 1997 10:40:48.66 1 J l Jan 1997 18:52:34.66 1 J l Jan 1997 20:36:26.74 1 J l Jan 1997 22:26:13.89 1 J	1 Jan 1997 10:40:48.66 1 Jan 1997 20:36:26.74	Iraq-To-Satellite22 - Start Time (UTCG)	7 10:13:06.51 7 20:09:56.85 7 Time (UTCC	1 Jan 1997 06:16:56.70 1 Ja 1 Jan 1997 08:00:09.86 1 Ja
w 4 n n	Global Statistics	Iraq-To-Satellite22 - Access In Satellite22 - Access In Satellite22 - Duration (sec.)	Global Statistics  Min Iraq-To-Satellite22 - Duration  Mean Iraq-To-Satellite22 - Duration  Mean Iraq-To-Satellite22 - Duration  Total Iraq-To-Satellite23 - Access Ir	2 1

	w 4 v v	1 Jan 1997 1 Jan 1997 1 Jan 1997 1 Jan 1997	1 Jan 1997 09:46:04.47 1 Jan 1997 18:03:18.00 1 Jan 1997 19:43:47.47 1 Jan 1997 21:30:35.13	1 Jan 1997 10:02:32.23 1 Jan 1997 18:16:32.92 1 Jan 1997 20:03:45.43 1 Jan 1997 21:48:13.01	987.764 794.917 13 1197.956 11 1057.879	
Global Statistics						
Min Iraq-To-Satellite23 - Duration Max Iraq-To-Satellite23 - Duration Mean Iraq-To-Satellite23 - Duration Total Iraq-To-Satellite23 - Duration		4 2	1 Jan 1997 18:03:18.00 1 Jan 1997 08:00:09.86		1 Jan 1997 18:16:32.92 1 Jan 1997 08:20:13.76 1027.417 6164.502	794.917 1203.903
Iraq-To-Satellite3 - Access Duration (sec)	ite3 - Access	Iraq-To-Satel	Iraq-To-Satellite3 - Start Time (UTCG)		Iraq-To-Satellite3 - Stop Time (UTCG) Iraq-To	Iraq-To-Satellite3 -
	1	1 Jan 1997 0		Jan 1997 00:19:30.28	1157.524	1
	2	1 Jan 1997 0	_	Jan 1997 02:00:17.46	494.185	
	3	1 Jan 1997 0	Jan 1997 09:20:55.02	Jan 1997 09:36:46.88	951.853	
	4	1 Jan 1997 11:04:19.01	1:04:19.01	Jan 1997 11:24:22.13	1203.122	
	5	1 Jan 1997 12:50:20.91	2:50:20.91	Jan 1997 13:06:27.63	966.723	
	9	1 Jan 1997 2	Jan 1997 21:07:02.52	Jan 1997 21:20:55.66	833.140	
· ·	7	1 Jan 1997 22:47:54.49	2:47:54.49	Jan 1997 23:07:56.64	1202.141	
Global Statistics						
Min Iraq-To-Satellite3 - Duration Max Iraq-To-Satellite3 - Duration Mean Iraq-To-Satellite3 - Duration Total Iraq-To-Satellite3 - Duration		<b>6</b> 4	1 Jan 1997 01:52:03.28 1 Jan 1997 11:04:19.01		1 Jan 1997 02:00:17.46 1 Jan 1997 11:24:22.13 972.670 6808.687	494.185 1203.122
Iraq-To-Satel Satellite31 - Duration (sec)	Iraq-To-Satellite31 - Access		Iraq-To-Satellite31 - Start Time (UTCG)		Iraq-To-Satellite31 - Stop Time (UTCG) Ira	Iraq-To-
		1 Jan 1997	1 Jan 1997 01:22:44.87	1 Jan 1997 01:36:16.74	74 811.868	

	0 K 4 V 0	1 Jan 1997 08:56:07.58 1 Jan 1997 10:38:10.60 1 Jan 1997 12:23:34.52 1 Jan 1997 20:43:54.96 1 Jan 1997 22:22:04.26	Jan 1997 08:56:07.58 Jan 1997 10:38:10.60 Jan 1997 12:23:34.52 Jan 1997 20:43:54.96 Jan 1997 22:22:04.26	1 Jan 1997 09:08:20.01 1 Jan 1997 10:58:05.48 1 Jan 1997 12:41:20.37 1 Jan 1997 20:52:54.20 1 Jan 1997 22:41:29.53		732.431 1194.882 1065.845 539.247 1165.266
Global Statistics		ر د د	1 Jan 1997 20:43:54.96 1 Jan 1997 10:38:10.60		1 Jan 1997 20:52:54.20 1 Jan 1997 10:58:05.48 918.257 5509.540	539.247 1194.882
Iraq-To-Satellite32 - Access Satellite32 - Duration (sec)	te32 - Access		Iraq-To-Satellite32 - Start Time (UTCG)		Iraq-To-Satellite32 - Stop Time (UTCG)	Iraq-To-
	1.2 6.4 8.9	1 Jan 1997 00:54:46.19 1 Jan 1997 10:12:11.96 1 Jan 1997 11:57:00.49 1 Jan 1997 13:45:23.96 1 Jan 1997 23:40:41.08	Jan 1997 00:54:46.19 Jan 1997 10:12:11.96 Jan 1997 11:57:00.49 Jan 1997 13:45:23.96 Jan 1997 21:56:34.31 Jan 1997 23:40:41.08	1 Jan 1997 01:11:04.91 1 Jan 1997 10:31:24.91 1 Jan 1997 12:15:56.25 1 Jan 1997 13:54:30.06 1 Jan 1997 22:14:52.60 2 Jan 1997 00:00:00.00		978.728 1152.954 1135.759 546.093 1098.290
Global Statistics  Min Iraq-To-Satellite32 - Duration  Max Iraq-To-Satellite32 - Duration  Mean Iraq-To-Satellite32 - Duration  Total Iraq-To-Satellite32 - Duration		4 0	1 Jan 1997 13:45:23.96 1 Jan 1997 23:40:41.08		1 Jan 1997 13:54:30.06 2 Jan 1997 00:00:00.00 1011.791 6070.745	546.093
Iraq-To-Satellite33 - Access Satellite33 - Access Satellite33 - Duration (sec)	e33 - Access	Iraq-To-Satellite33 - Sta 1 Jan 1997 00:27:25.69	Iraq-To-Satellite33 - Start Time (UTCG)	1 =	Iraq-To-Satellite33 - Stop Time (UTCG) Ira	Iraq-To- 

2 8 4 3 2 6 8 9 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9	1 Jan 1997 09:46:24.15 1 Jan 1997 11:30:35.70 1 Jan 1997 13:17:27.60 1 Jan 1997 21:31:28.77 1 Jan 1997 23:14:07.96	1 Jan 1997 10:04:19.39 1075.242 1 Jan 1997 11:50:21.18 1185.487 1 Jan 1997 13:30:58.23 810.627 1 Jan 1997 21:48:03.95 995.173 1 Jan 1997 23:34:15.47 1207.511	1 3 4 7 5
Global Statistics  Min Iraq-To-Satellite33 - Duration  Max Iraq-To-Satellite33 - Duration  Mean Iraq-To-Satellite33 - Duration  Total Iraq-To-Satellite33 - Duration	4 1 Jan 1997 13:17:27.60 6 1 Jan 1997 23:14:07.96	7.60 1 Jan 1997 13:30:58.23 07.96 1 Jan 1997 23:34:15.47 1058.939 6353.631	810.627
Iraq-To-Satellite4 - Access Duration (sec)	Ä	Iraq-To-Satellite4 - Stop Time (UTCG)	Iraq-To-Satellite4 -
- 2 6 4 3 5 - 0	1 Jan 1997 00:04:43.05 1 Jan 1997 01:45:03.78 1 Jan 1997 03:31:46.38 1 Jan 1997 12:50:28.03 1 Jan 1997 14:34:46.64 1 Jan 1997 16:21:50.28	1 Jan 1997 00:17:42.61 1 Jan 1997 02:04:59.94 1 Jan 1997 03:49:30.25 1 Jan 1997 13:08:39.12 1 Jan 1997 14:54:25.74 1 Jan 1997 16:34:44.11 1 Jan 1997 16:34:44.11	
Global Statistics  Min Iraq-To-Satellite4 - Duration  Max Iraq-To-Satellite4 - Duration  Mean Iraq-To-Satellite4 - Duration  Total Iraq-To-Satellite4 - Duration	6 1 Jan 1997 16:21:50.28 2 1 Jan 1997 01:45:03.78	28 1 Jan 1997 16:34:44.11 .78 1 Jan 1997 02:04:59.94 1013.936 6083.619	773.829
Iraq-To-Satellite41 - Access Satellite41 - Duration (sec)	ccess Iraq-To-Satellite41 - Start Time (UTCG)	Iraq-To-Satellite41 - Stop Time (UTCG)	Iraq-To- 

. 3 5	1 Jan 1997 03:04:30.85 1 Jan 1997 04:57:01.91	1 Jan 1997 03:23:37.47 1146.625 1 Jan 1997 05:03:38.58 396.665	10
4	1 Jan 1997 12:24:54.48		
S	1 Jan 1997 14:08:28.51	1 Jan 1997 14:28:30.62	•
9	1 Jan 1997 15:54:38.16		
Global Statistics			
Min Iraq-To-Satellite41 - Duration	3 1 Jan 1997 04:57:01.91	91 1 Jan 1997 05:03:38.58	396.665
Max Iraq-To-Satellite41 - Duration Mean Iraq-To-Satellite41 - Duration	5 1 Jan 1997 14:08:28.51	1 Jan 1997 14:28:30.62	1202.108
Total Iraq-To-Satellite41 - Duration		969.910 5819.462	
Treat To Catallited A Access			!
satellite42 - Duration (sec)	s 11aq-10-sateliite42 - start 11me (U1CG)	Iraq-10-Satellite42 - Stop Time (UTCG)	Iraq-To-
	1 Jan 1997 00:53:53.73	1 Jan 1997 01:11:50.83	
2	1 Jan 1997 02:37:40.40		
E	1 Jan 1997 04:27:19.32		
4	1 Jan 1997 11:59:56.05		
5	1 Jan 1997 13:42:18.53	1 Jan 1997 14:02:17.25	
9	1 Jan 1997 15:27:48.93	1 Jan 1997 15:45:20.29	
7	1 Jan 1997 23:47:20.46	1 Jan 1997 23:57:30.89 610.426	
Global Statistics			
Mir Land To Challist Comment			
Max Iraq-10-Satellite42 - Duration Max Iraq-To-Satellite42 - Duration	7 1 Jan 1997 23:47:20.46 5 1 Jan 1997 13:42:18.53	l6 1 Jan 1997 23:57:30.89 1 Jan 1997 14:02:17 25	610.426
Mean Iraq-To-Satellite42 - Duration Total Iraq-To-Satellite42 - Duration			1170:123

Iraq-To-Satellite43 - Access Iraq-To-Satellite43 - Start Time (UTCG) Iraq-To-Satellite43 - Stop Time (UTCG) Iraq-To-Satellite43 - Stop Time (UTCG) Iraq-To-Satellite43 - Duration (sec)

1 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7	1 Jan 1997 00:28:56.30 1 Jan 1997 02:11:11.68 1 Jan 1997 03:59:10.81 1 Jan 1997 11:37:17.35 1 Jan 1997 13:16:17.94 1 Jan 1997 15:01:12.98 1 Jan 1997 16:50:03.88	Jan 1997 00:44:58.84 96  Jan 1997 02:31:20.75  Jan 1997 04:15:06:30 95  Jan 1997 11:42:19.07 36  Jan 1997 13:35:41.12 11  Jan 1997 15:19:56:40 111  Jan 1997 16:57:59:67 47	962.539 1209.070 955.491 301.719 1163.182 1123.418
Global Statistics			
Min Iraq-To-Satellite43 - Duration Max Iraq-To-Satellite43 - Duration Mean Iraq-To-Satellite43 - Duration Total Iraq-To-Satellite43 - Duration	4 1 Jan 1997 11:37:17.35 2 1 Jan 1997 02:11:11.68	1 Jan 1997 11:42:19.07 1 Jan 1997 02:31:20.75 884.459 6191.215	301.719
Iraq-To-Satellite5 - Access Duration (sec)	ss Iraq-To-Satellite5 - Start Time (UTCG)	Iraq-To-Satellite5 - Stop Time (UTCG)	Iraq-To-Satellite5 -
1 2 3 4 4 6 6	1 Jan 1997 03:32:49.90 1 Jan 1997 05:15:22.80 1 Jan 1997 07:03:36.94 1 Jan 1997 14:40:14.21 1 Jan 1997 16:20:24.46 1 Jan 1997 18:05:25.96 1 Jan 1997 19:54:51.96	Jan 1997 03:49:16.44       986.538         Jan 1997 05:35:30.93       1208.130         Jan 1997 07:19:06.99       930.050         Jan 1997 14:47:50.08       455.877         Jan 1997 16:39:56.66       1172.199         Jan 1997 20:01:21.29       389.327	538 130 050 877 199 083
Global Statistics			
Min Iraq-To-Satellite5 - Duration Max Iraq-To-Satellite5 - Duration Mean Iraq-To-Satellite5 - Duration Total Iraq-To-Satellite5 - Duration	7 1 Jan 1997 19:54:51.96 2 1 Jan 1997 05:15:22.80	1 Jan 1997 20:01:21.29 1 Jan 1997 05:35:30.93 893.315 6253.202	389.327 1208.130

Iraq-To-Satellite51 - Access Iraq-To-Satellite51 - Start Time (UTCG) Iraq-To-Satellite51 - Stop Time (UTCG) Iraq-To-Satellite51 - Duration (sec)

1	1 Jan 1997 03:08:26.99	1	Jan 1997 03:22:06.06	819.070	
2	1 Jan 1997 04:49:10.82	-	Jan 1997 05:09:11.51	1200.691	
က	1 Jan 1997 06:36:06.84	-	Jan 1997 06:53:34.91	1048 078	
4	1 Jan 1997 15:54:32.62	1	Jan 1997 16:12:58.74	1106,123	
\$	1 Jan 1997 17:38:58.02	1	Jan 1997 17:58:29.69	1171.662	
9	1 Jan 1997 19:26:14.81	-	Jan 1997 19:38:27.91	733.100	
Global Statistics					
Min Iraq-To-Satellite51 - Duration Max Iraq-To-Satellite51 - Duration	6 11	1 Jan 1997 19:26:14.81	1 Jan 1997 19:38:27.91	9:38:27.91	733.100
Mean Iraq-To-Satellite51 - Duration		20:01:71:00 / / / mm	1 3411 1997	1013.121	1200.091
Total Iraq-To-Satellite51 - Duration				6078.724	
Iraq-To-Satellite52 - Acce Satellite52 - Duration (sec)	ess Iraq-To-Satellite	Iraq-To-Satellite52 - Start Time (UTCG)	Iraq-To-Satellite52 - Stop Time (UTCG)	· Stop Time (UTCG) Iraq-To-	ro-
	1 Jan 1997 02:45:29.51	1	Jan 1997 02:53:56.92	507.406	1
2	1 Jan 1997 04:23:22, 13	_	Ian 1997 04-42-43 75	1161 679	
· m	1 Jan 1997 06:08:50.07	-	Ian 1997 06:27:44 51	1134 428	
4	1 Ian 1007 08:02:16 04		1007.08.06.20 66	007-670	
+ 1	1 Jan 1997 06:02	-	Jan 1997 08:00:39.55	262.608	
0	1 Jan 1997 15:28:55.11	1	Jan 1997 15:45:38.82	1003.707	
9	1 Jan 1997 17:12:38.43	-	Jan 1997 17:32:38.76	1200.322	
7	1 Jan 1997 18:58:56.31		Jan 1997 19:14:15.28	918.969	
Global Statistics					
Min Iraq-To-Satellite52 - Duration	4 1 Js	1 Jan 1997 08:02:16.94	1 Jan 1997 08:06:39.55	:06:39.55	262.608
Max Iraq-To-Satellite52 - Duration	6 1 J	1 Jan 1997 17:12:38.43	1 Jan 1997 17:32:38.76	7:32:38.76	1200.322
Mean Iraq-1 o-Satellite52 - Duration Total Iraq-To-Satellite52 - Duration				884.154 6189.078	

Iraq-To-Satellite53 - Access Iraq-To-Satellite53 - Start Time (UTCG) Iraq-To-Satellite53 - Stop Time (UTCG) Iraq-To-Satellite53 - Duration (sec)

1	1 Jan 1997 03:57:53.31	1 Jan 1997 04:16:06.01	1092.701	ł
2	1 Jan 1997 05:41:54.73	1 Jan 1997 06:01:42.26	1187.523	
6	1 Jan 1997 07:31:56.63	1 Jan 1997 07:44:01.64	725.010	
4	1 Jan 1997 15:03:47.79	1 Jan 1997 15:17:35.58	827.790	
5	1 Jan 1997 16:46:26.92	1 Jan 1997 17:06:28.46	1201.533	
9	1 Jan 1997 18:32:03.95	1 Jan 1997 18:49:19.51	1035.558	
Global Statistics				
Min Iraq-To-Satellite53 - Duration Max Iraq-To-Satellite53 - Duration	3 1 Jan 1997 07:31:56.63 5 1 Jan 1997 16:46:26.92	56.63 1 Jan 1997 07:44:01.64 26.92 1 Jan 1997 17:06:28.46	.46	725.010 1201.533
Mean Iraq-To-Satellite53 - Duration Total Iraq-To-Satellite53 - Duration			1011.686 6070.115	
Trag-To-Satellite6 - Access		Trag-To-Satellite6 - Start Time (UTCG)	(UTCG) Irag-To-S	atellite6 -
Duration (sec)		, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,		
	1 Jan 1997 07:01:53.92	1 Jan 1997 07:20:20.97	1107.049	
2	1 Jan 1997 08:46:10.00	1 Jan 1997 09:05:50.85	1180.846	
8	1 Jan 1997 10:36:37.39	1 Jan 1997 10:47:49.69	672.301	
4	1 Jan 1997 18:07:42.19	1 Jan 1997 18:22:09.37	867.184	
\$	1 Jan 1997 19:50:35.78	1 Jan 1997 20:10:39.07	1203.293	
9	1 Jan 1997 21:36:19.52	1 Jan 1997 21:53:17.94	1018.418	
Global Statistics				
Min Iraq-To-Satellite6 - Duration Max Iraq-To-Satellite6 - Duration Mean Iraq-To-Satellite6 - Duration Total Iraq-To-Satellite6	3 1 Jan 1997 10:36:37.39 5 1 Jan 1997 19:50:35.78	1 Jan 1997 10:47:49.65 1 Jan 1997 20:10:39.0	1008.182	672.301 1203.293
TOTAL TRAPETO - DAMPANT		•	200000	

Iraq-To-Satellite61 - Access Iraq-To-Satellite61 - Start Time (UTCG) Iraq-To-Satellite61 - Stop Time (UTCG) Iraq-To-Satellite61 - Duration (sec)

1	1 Jan 1997 06:36:44.84	1 Jan 1997 06:53:33.61	1008.775
2	1 Jan 1997 08:19:34.78	1 Jan 1997 08:39:41.00	1206.215
3	1 Jan 1997 10:08:04.70	1 Jan 1997 10:23:06.66	901.964
4	1 Jan 1997 17:43:41.82	1 Jan 1997 17:52:54.61	552.790
	1 Jan 1997 19:24:31.55	1 Jan 1997 19:44:11.53	1179.987
9	1 Jan 1997 21:09:39.38	1 Jan 1997 21:27:58.17	1098.788
7	1 Jan 1997 23:00:06.05	1 Jan 1997 23:04:27.05	261.004
Global Statistics			
***************************************			
Min Iraq-To-Satellite61 - Duration Max Iraq-To-Satellite61 - Duration	7 1 Jan 1997 23:00:06.05 2 1 Jan 1997 08:19:34.78	5 1 Jan 1997 23:04:27.05 '8 1 Jan 1997 08:39:41.00	261.004
Mean Iraq-To-Satellite61 - Duration Total Iraq-To-Satellite61 - Duration			
Iraq-To-Satellite62 - Access Satellite62 - Access Satellite62 - Duration (sec)		Iraq-To-Satellite62 - Start Time (UTCG) Iraq-To-Satellite62 - Stop Time (UTCG)	ICG) Iraq-To-
1	1 Jan 1997 06:12:13.26	1 Jan 1997 06:26:28:30	855 043
2.	1 Jan 1997 07:53:18.71	1 Jan 1997 08:13:22.98	1204.272
B	1 Jan 1997 09:40:27.64	1 Jan 1997 09:57:39.11	1031.468
4	1 Jan 1997 18:58:37.91	1 Jan 1997 19:17:18.62	1120.706
5	1 Jan 1997 20:43:09.81	1 Jan 1997 21:02:32.99	1163.183
9	1 Jan 1997 22:30:41.41	1 Jan 1997 22:42:09.27	687.858
Global Statistics			
Min Iraq-To-Satellite62 - Duration		1 Jan 1997 22:42:09.27	687.858
Max Iraq-10-Satellite62 - Duration	2 1 Jan 1997 07:53:18.71	1 Jan 1997 08:13:22.98	1204.272
Mean Iraq-10-Satellite62 - Duration Total Iraq-To-Satellite62 - Duration		1010.42 6062.531	1010.422 062.531

Iraq-To-Satellite63 - Access Iraq-To-Satellite63 - Start Time (UTCG) Iraq-To-Satellite63 - Stop Time (UTCG) Iraq-To-Satellite63 - Duration (sec)

3 4 4 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6	I Jail	In 1007 07:27:35 70	1 Jan 1797 07:40:30:70		
4 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6	1 Jan	Jan 1997 09:13:10.43	1 Jan 1997 09:31:51.29	1120.857	
5 6 Global Statistics	1 Jan	Jan 1997 18:32:56.87	1 Jan 1997 18:50:02.97	1026,099	
6 Global Statistics	1 Jan	Jan 1997 20:16:48.77	1 Jan 1997 20:36:46.31	1197.535	
Global Statistics	1 Jan	Jan 1997 22:03:15.30	1 Jan 1997 22:18:07.41	892.103	
Min Iraq-To-Satellite63 - Duration Max Iraq-To-Satellite63 - Duration	1 5	1 Jan 1997 05:48:51.70 1 Jan 1997 20:16:48.77	1 Jan 1997 05:58:36.81 18.77 1 Jan 1997 20:36:46.3		585.110
Mean Iraq-To-Satellite63 - Duration Total Iraq-To-Satellite63 - Duration				998.778 5992.670	
Iraq-To-Satellite7 - Access		satellite7 - Start Time (UTC	raq-To-Satellite7 - Start Time (UTCG) Iraq-To-Satellite7 - Stop Time (UTCG) Iraq-To-Satellite7 -	ime (UTCG) Iraq-To-Sate	ellite7 -
Duration (sec)					
1	1 Jan 19	Jan 1997 00:33:18.06	1 Jan 1997 00:50:39.40	1041.348	,
2	1 Jan 19	Jan 1997 08:52:21.81	1 Jan 1997 09:03:10.92	649.105	
3	1 Jan 19	Jan 1997 10:31:30.27	1 Jan 1997 10:51:09.53	1179.256	
4	1 Jan 19	Jan 1997 12:17:31.89	1 Jan 1997 12:35:57.63	1105.740	
\$	1 Jan 19	Jan 1997 21:36:59.58	1 Jan 1997 21:54:25.90	1046.325	
9	1 Jan 19	Jan 1997 23:20:59.39	1 Jan 1997 23:40:53.15	1193.760	
Global Statistics					
	•				
Min Iraq-To-Satellite7 - Duration Max Iraq-To-Satellite7 - Duration	9	1 Jan 1997 08:52:21.81 1 Jan 1997 23:20:59.39	1 Jan 1997 09:03:10.92 19 1 Jan 1997 23:40:53.15		649.105 1193.760
Mean Iraq-To-Satellite7 - Duration Total Iraq-To-Satellite7 - Duration				1035.922 6215.535	

Iraq-To-Satellite71 - Access Iraq-To-Satellite71 - Start Time (UTCG) Iraq-To-Satellite71 - Stop Time (UTCG) Iraq-To-Satellite71 - Duration (sec)

1 2 2 2 3 2 5 4 4 3 5 7	1 Jan 1997 00:06:40.79 1 Jan 1997 01:55:52.86 1 Jan 1997 10:05:55.42 1 Jan 1997 11:50:26.13 1 Jan 1997 13:41:22.46 1 Jan 1997 22:54:44.96		Jan 1997 00:25:16.29 Jan 1997 02:02:55.73 Jan 1997 10:24:35.63 Jan 1997 12:09:59.13 Jan 1997 13:51:35.64 Jan 1997 21:26:40.95 Jan 1997 23:14:48.99	1115.495 422.864 1120.215 1173.002 613.179 902.243	
Global Statistics  Min Iraq-To-Satellite71 - Duration  Max Iraq-To-Satellite71 - Duration  Mean Iraq-To-Satellite71 - Duration  Total Iraq-To-Satellite71 - Duration		1 Jan 1997 01:55:52.86 1 Jan 1997 22:54:44.96	1 Jan 1997 02:02:55.73 1 Jan 1997 23:14:48.99		1204.026
Iraq-To-Satellite72 - Access Satellite72 - Access  1 2 3 4 4 5 6		e72 - Start Time (UTCG)  27:25.42	Iraq-To-Satellite72 - Start Time (UTCG)       Iraq-To-Satellite72 - Stop Time (UTCG)         1 Jan 1997 01:27:25.42       1 Jan 1997 01:39:53.49       748.         1 Jan 1997 09:40:40.93       1 Jan 1997 09:57:50.34       1029         1 Jan 1997 11:23:47.51       1 Jan 1997 13:27:04.95       870.         1 Jan 1997 22:28:39.07       1 Jan 1997 22:48:25.65       1186	me (UTCG) Iraq-To- 748.070 1029.410 1203.315 870.806 631.828 1186.574	
Global Statistics	3 3 1	1 Jan 1997 20:47:16.15 1 Jan 1997 11:23:47.51	1 Jan 1997 20:57:47.98 1 Jan 1997 11:43:50.83	945.000	631.828 1203.315

Iraq-To-Satellite73 - Access Iraq-To-Satellite73 - Start Time (UTCG) Iraq-To-Satellite73 - Stop Time (UTCG) Iraq-To-Satellite73 - Duration (sec)

	1	1 Jan 199	Jan 1997 01:00:09.28	1 Jan 199	Jan 1997 01:15:37.33	928.045	
	7	1 Jan 199	Jan 1997 09:16:01.47	1 Jan 199	Jan 1997 09:30:49.51	888.039	
	3	1 Jan 199	Jan 1997 10:57:27.35	1 Jan 199	Jan 1997 11:17:34.23	1206.881	
	4	1 Jan 199	Jan 1997 12:44:49.53	1 Jan 199	Jan 1997 13:01:42.60	1013.073	
	5	1 Jan 199	Jan 1997 22:02:43.59	1 Jan 199	Jan 1997 22:21:37.54	1133.953	
	9	1 Jan 199	1 Jan 1997 23:47:21.87	2 Jan 199	2 Jan 1997 00:00:00:00	758.134	
Global Statistics				,			
Min Iraq-To-Satellite73 - Duration		9	1 Jan 1997 23:47:21.87	7:21.87	2 Jan 1997 00:00:00.00		758.134
Max Iraq-To-Satellite73 - Duration		3	1 Jan 1997 10:57:27.35	7:27.35	1 Jan 1997 11:17:34.23		1206.881
Mean Iraq-To-Satellite73 - Duration						988.021	
Total Iraq-To-Satellite73 - Duration						5928.125	

## LIST OF REFERENCES

- Lee, James G., Counterspace Operations for Information Dominance, Air University, 1994.
- 2. Aviation Week and Space Technology, July 15, 1996.
- 3. The ARL Antenna Book, American Radio League, 1997. Note: Picture was modified by adding the red circle for illustration purposes.
- 4. Ball, Robert E., The Fundamentals of Aircraft Combat Survivability Analysis and Design, AIAA, 1985.
- 5. Knott, Shaffer, and Tuley, Radar Cross Section Reduction course notes, 1995.
- Stimson, George W., Introduction to Airborne Radar, Hughes Aircraft Company, 1983.
- Sellers, Jerry John, Satellite Tool Kit Astronautics Primer, Analytical Graphics Inc., 1996.
- 8. Collier's 1998 Encyclopedia, Sierra On-Line Inc., 1997.
- 9. Satellite Tool Kit, Software Version 4.0, Analytical Graphics Inc., 1996.
- 10. Knott, Shaffer, and Tuley, Radar Cross Section, Artech House Inc., 1993.
- 11. Agrawal, Brij N., Design of Geosyncronous Spacecraft, Agrawal, 1986.
- 12. TRW Space Data, TRW Space and Technology Group, 1992.
- 13. Skolnik, Merril, Radar Handbook, McGraw-Hill Inc., 1990.
- Graves, R. H. W., Detection of Airborne Targets By A Space Based Radar Using Multipath Interference, 1991 IEEE Report.

- Wang, H.S.C., Main Lobe Clutter Cancellation By DPCA For Space-Based Radars,
   1991 IEEE Report.
- 16. Hasan, M. A., Impact of Tracking Requirements On Space-Based Radar (SBR)
  Design, 1990 IEEE Report.
- 17. Aviation Week and Space Technology, April 17, 1995.
- 18. Launchspace, August/September 1997.
- 19. Muolo, Michael J., Space Handbook-A War Fighter's Guide to Space, Air University Press 1993.
- 20. The Washington Post, October 3, 1997.

## INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1.	Defense Technical Information Cent 8725 John J. Kingman Rd., Ste 0944 Ft. Belvoir, Va 22060-6218		2
2.	Dudley Knox Library Naval Postgraduate School 411 Dyer Rd. Montery, CA 93943-5101		2
3.	Prof. Robert E. Ball, Code AA/BP		1
4.	Prof. M. Ross, Code AA/Ro		1
5.	Survivabilty Division/Code 4.1.8 Attn: Goff/Bldg 2187 Suite1144 NAWCAD 48110 Shaw Road Unit 5 Patuxent River, MD 20670-1906		2
6.	Survivabilty Division/Code 4.1.8 Attn: Ricks/Bldg 2187 Suite1120-A2 NAWCAD 48110 Shaw Road Unit 5 Patuxent River, MD 20670-1906	); #:	3
7.	Analytical Graphics 660 American Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406		1